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THE DISTRUST OF POLITICS
TERRANCE SANDALOW*
In this Article, Dean Sandalow considers the justifications advanced by those who
favor the removal of certain political issues from the political process by extending
the reach of judicial review. He begins by examining the distrust of politics in a

different context, discussing the proposals made by the Progressivesfor reforming
municipalgovernment, as a vehicle to expose the assumptionsunderlying the current
debate. His comparison of the two historical settings reveals many similaritiesbetween the Progressives'reform proposalsand the contemporary justiflcations.[orthe
displacement of politics with constitutionallaw. Dean Sandalow concludes that the
distrust of politics rests not on deficiencies in the political process, as commentators

like ProfessorEly have suggested, but ratheron a disagreement with the substantive
results that the political process yields.
INTRODUCTION

The day after his inauguration, President Reagan convened the
first meeting of his cabinet and publicly instructed its members that in
discharging their responsibilities, they were not to be swayed by
politics, but were to be guided solely by the best interests of the
American people.' Sophisticates no doubt chuckled and promptly
dismissed the statement as a bit of rhetorical fluff. Yet, however little
the President's statement may tell us about the future behavior of his
administration, it is not without interest. Even when its credibility is
suspect, a statement may reveal a great deal about attitudes, either of
the speaker or of his audience. In this instance, it seems likely that the
statement reveals less about the President's attitudes than it does about
those of his real audience, the public.
The popular distrust of politics which is reflected in President
Reagan's statement is one of the continuing undercurrents of the
American political tradition. Its force may be felt, to take a more
consequential example, in the increasingly frequent proposals for a
constitutional amendment that would limit the President to a single
term of six years, a reform that would, it is argued, reduce the need
for the President to attend to politics and thereby "enhance the objectivity and public acceptance of the measures he urges in the national
interest." 2 The distrust of politics is evident also in much recent
discussion of constitutional law. During the past quarter century, the
answers to an extraordinary variety of questions of public policy have
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B., 1954; J.D., 1957, University of
Chicago.

I N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1981, at Al, col. 2.
2

Cutler, To Form a Government, 59 Foreign Aff. 126, 142 (1980).
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been found in the Constitution. Issues that traditionally were regarded as within the domain of the legislature have thus come to be
decided by courts. The justifications advanced in support of this trend
often rest on the notion that there are important areas of public policy
in which the political process cannot be trusted to achieve an appropriate resolution of the competing claims.
Of course, a judicial decision that the Constitution dictates an
answer to a question of governmental policy does not entirely remove
that question from the political arena. Public controversy regarding
the content of governmental policy in respect of abortion continues
despite the decision in Roe v. Wade.3 In this as in other situations in
which the Constitution has been read to limit governmental power,
the way is open through the political process for a constitutional
amendment that would restore that power. Or, over time, the political process might produce a change in the composition of the Supreme
Court that would lead to a reinterpretation of the Constitution enlarging legislative authority. Neither possibility is fanciful; but experience demonstrates that both are too remote to disturb the common
understanding that a constitutional decision is an alternative to a
political decision, and not merely a step in the political process.4
The displacement of politics by constitutional law now extends
across a broad front. I need not attempt the imposing task of describing the full extent of the displacement, but a few illustrations will
make more vivid the understanding of how far the distrust of politics
has carried us.
1. For various reasons, many parents prefer (or, all other things
being equal, would prefer) that their children attend private schools.
Some believe that their children will be better educated or safer or
better disciplined in such schools; others, that instruction in secular
subjects should be integrated with the inculcation of religious values;
and still others have reasons many of us would find morally objectionable, such as that they wish their children to attend racially homogeneous schools. Many citizens, moved by self-interest, by a conception
of fairness, or by a belief in the desirability of fostering pluralism in
the educational system, have insistently demanded that government
3 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
4 Elsewhere, I have argued for changes in constitutional doctrine that would permit
judicial review to become merely a step in the political proems, rather than a means of imposing

limits upon it. See Sandalow; Judicial Protection of Minorities, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1162, 1183-94
(1977); Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the
Judicial Role, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653, 693-703 (1975). Although a growing body of decisions
supports that position, the conventional view is still dominant and I shall, accordingly, assune it
throughout this paper.
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facilitate parental capacity to choose between private and public
schooling by subventing private schools, either directly or through tax
relief for parents who choose such schools for their children. Their
claims have been opposed, with equal vigor, by persons holding an
equally broad spectrum of views. Some believe that all private schools
should be prohibited in the interest of national unity; others would
permit private schools, but contend that governmental funding of
religious schools, which account for most private school enrollment,
would violate our national tradition of the separation of church and
state; still others oppose state aid for reasons many of us would find
morally objectionable, as for example anti-Catholic sentiment.
The accommodation of these competing views presents a classic
political problem. Constitutional law has, however, displaced politics
in defining the main outlines of governmental policy. Piercev. Society
of Sisters- established the constitutional right of parents to choose
private schools for their children. More recent decisions prohibit the
states from facilitating that choice by disallowing either direct aid to
religious schools or reimbursements or tax credits to parents for their
tuition payments to such schoolsA Issues of the utmost importance in
defining the nation's educational policies, whose resolution significantly affects our social and political structure, have thus been determined by the Supreme Court rather than the political process.
2. Throughout the past century, but in recent years at an accelerating pace, our society has been engaged in reassessing the role of
women. The consequence has been continuing movement toward
legal equality between the sexes. Many men and women believe that
full equality entails the abolition of all distinctions based upon sex.
Yet, it follows from the pervasiveness of the distinction in our law that
many different issues are raised by the call for its total abolition.
Proposals to equalize liability for alimony 7 engage interests different
from those at stake when the issue is whether men and women may
purchase alcohol at the same age; 8 and both affect interests different
from those that must be considered in deciding whether men and
women shall be equally subject to compulsory military service. 9
Controversy regarding the call for total abolition of sex-based legal
distinctions is assured by the breadth and depth of the societal patterns and traditions affected.
5 268 U.S.

510 (1925).
Committee for Pub. Edue. & Religious Lib. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
7 See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979).
8 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
' See Rostker v. Goldberg, 101 S. Ct. 2646 (1981).
6
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The Supreme Court has not entirely withdrawn from the legislative domain the question whether government may continue to discriminate on the basis of sex. It has, however, very substantially
narrowed the range of permissible political decisions regarding sexbased distinctions. In declaring sex an almost-but-not-quite suspect
basis of classification,1 0 it has served notice that it will tolerate political decisions to discriminate on the basis of sex only rarely, in circumstances in which it determines that the reasons are sufficiently
weighty.' Authority to render a final decision concerning the direction and pace of the law's response to a central problem of social
change has, thus, shifted from the political process to the judicial
forum.
3. The mounting cost of political campaigns poses painfully difficult questions. Democracy depends upon a broad dissemination of
information and ideas. Competition among political candidates and
among competing interest groups is the best method yet devised for
ensuring that the public receives the knowledge that it requires. The
declining influence of political parties and the increased importance
of the mass media have, however, considerably added to the cost of
communicating with the public. The consequence, in the view of
many observers, is that the outcomes of political campaigns have
become dangerously dependent upon the support of those individuals
and interest groups that can most easily raise funds to promote the
candidates or causes that they favor. Adherents of this view frequently
cite the risk of corruption, but their deeper concern is the potential
distortion of democratic processes if money permits some individuals
and interest groups to exercise what these adherents regard as disproportionate influence on the formation of public policy. They conclude
that government should impose limits upon the power of individuals
and corporations to make expenditures in political campaigns.
There is, of course, an opposing view. Individuals and groups
spend money in political campaigns because they wish to communicate with others and to gain support for their views. A restriction on
the amount of money that can be spent on political communication
during a campaign necessarily reduces the capacity of individuals or
groups to communicate their views and, thus, diminishes the public's
access to those views. Expenditure restrictions may also inhibit the rise
of third parties, thus limiting not only the public's access to informa-

10See, e.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268 (1979); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
11See Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
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tion and ideas, but also the range of choices available for expressing its
preferences.
The choice between these arguments is in the end a choice between differing views about the desirable shape of the Amefican
political system, views that rest upon strikingly different conceptions
of the meaning and requirements of democratic government.
Congress addressed this exquisitely difficult problem in the Federal
Election Campaign Act by enacting comprehensive restrictions on
contributions to political campaigns and expenditures in relation
thereto.12 In Buckley v. Valeo,13 the Supreme Court, although sustaining the Act's contribution limitations, invalidated a number of
important provisions restricting expenditures, provisions that were, in
the view of many observers, necessary to the effectiveness of the
congressional scheme. Two years later, in First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti," the Court imposed additional limits upon governmental power to reduce the influence of money in politics, invalidating a state statute that prohibited certain corporate expenditures
made to influence the vote in referenda. The full reach of these
decisions is not yet clear, but it is evident that they will have a
significant effect on the structure of the national political system and,
indeed, on the most important issue in any political system-"who
governs?"
My purpose in offering these illustrations is not to raise questions
about the wisdom of the policies advanced by the Court's decisions,
but to demonstrate how far we have gone in removing from politics
issues that, in a democracy, one would expect to be resolved through a
political process. Most recent justifications for the displacement of
politics, as suggested above, rest upon an explicit or implicit claim
that there are conflicts that ought not to be entrusted to the political
process. I propose in the remainder of this Article to consider some of
the reasons that have been advanced in support of that claim. Although I am principally concerned with the justifications that have
been advanced for extending the reach of constitutional law, it may
be useful to begin the discussion by considering the distrust of politics
in another setting. A brief examination of the phenomenon at a historical remove, in a setting that is no longer emotionally charged, may

Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263
(1974) (current version at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9042, and other scattered
sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 47 U.S.C. (1976 & Supp. 11 1979)).
13424 U.S. 1 (1976).
12

1' 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
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aid us in understanding some of the contemporary justifications for
narrowing the sphere of politics through constitutional law.
Accordingly, I want to examine briefly the proposals made by the
Progressives at the turn of the century for reforming municipal government. In doing so, I do not intend to suggest that the Progressives'
reform proposals and contemporary justifications for constricting the
role of politics through constitutional law can be forced into a single
mold. The historical contexts, the particular problems addressed by
the Progressives and by those who would substitute constitutional
adjudication for politics, and the attitudes and goals of the two groups
differ too much for any such attempt to be useful. Moreover, just as
there are important differences among those who look to courts for the
resolution of important societal conflicts, the Progressive movement
was not monolithic. An effort to establish that the Progressive reform
proposals and contemporary justifications for judicial review rest
upon precisely the same foundation would ignore or distort all these
differences. Nevertheless, a comparison may help to expose some of
the assumptions underlying current discussion of the appropriate relationship between politics and constitutional law, and to suggest some
of the problems created by the tendency to resolve controversies by
constitutional adjudication rather than by the political process. At
least, that is my thesis.
I
The decades bracketing the beginning of the present century, the
era of Populism and Progressivism, were marked, as the past two
decades have been, by profound social change. Rapid industrial
growth and concentration of capital, increasing urbanization, and a
massive tide of immigration, composed largely of persons whose ethnic origins differed from those of earlier immigrants, produced severe
dislocations in the existing order. One of the more interesting chapters
in the history of the period concerns the attempts of the Progressives to
reform municipal government.I s
The agenda of reform was lengthy. It included proposals for
establishing nonpartisan government; separating local from state and
national elections; instituting a city manager form of government;
adopting procedures for initiatives, referenda, and recall; strengthening the municipal executive; and electing members of the local legislative body at-large rather than from districts. Although each of the
Is The following account is drawn primarily from E. Banfield & J. Wilson, City Politics
(1963), and R. Hofstadter, The Age of Reform (1955).
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proposals had a somewhat distinctive rationale, all rested in some
measure upon the desire to reduce, if not eliminate, the influence of
politics in municipal government. Cities, it was often argued, are not
truly political entities; they are, like businesses, engaged in the provision of services, and they ought therefore to be managed on the same
principles as a business. The notion that cities should be managed on a
"business-like" basis was in part a reaction to the extraordinary level
of corruption in the politics of the period. But it also rested upon more
fundamental ideas about city government. The reformers argued that
the location of a school or library, the management of police and
sanitation departments, and a host of other matters that are the
staples of municipal government should be decided disinterestedly,
i.e., impartially in the interest of the community as a whole. Politics,
in their view, merely diverted municipal governments from the
proper performance of their responsibilities; it was a vehicle for expressing private and special interests, not the public interest of the city
"as a whole." Since the task of discovering the content of the public
interest was regarded as more technical than political,
[w]hat was necessary was to put affairs entirely in the hands of the
few who were "best qualified," persons whose training, experience,
natural ability, and devotion to public service equipped them best
to manage the public business. The best qualified men would
decide "policy" and leave its execution ("administration") to professionals ("experts") who would work under the direction of an
executive (mayor or manager) in whom authority over administration would be highly centralized. Interference in the management
of public affairs, especially attempts to assert private or other
partial interests against the public interest, would not be tolerated.16
We are apt to think of the reform proposals on the Progressives'
agenda more as attempts to restructure politics than to eliminate its
influence, and in a sense they were. But the political order that the
reformers sought to establish was one that, in retrospect, seems remarkably bloodless. It appears to have been assumed that persons of
good will and sound judgment would arrive at the same understanding regarding the public interest. Richard Hofstadter illustrates the
prevailing attitude by quoting Josiah Strong's statement that "[i]f
public opinion is educated concerning a given reform-political, social, industrial, or moral-and if the popular conscience is sufficiently
awake to enforce an enlightened public opinion, the reform is accom16E. Banfield & J. Wilson, supra note 15, at 139-40.
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plished straightaway."'17 The aim of the reformers, consequently,
was to structure government in a way that would permit disinterested
citizens to govern through the agency of expert administrators. "The
problem," Hofstadter wrote,
was to devise such governmental machinery as would empower
[the Man of Good Will] to rule. Since he was dissociated from all
special interests and biases and had nothing but the common weal
at heart, he would rule well. He would act and think as a public
spirited individual, unlike all the groups that were ready to prey on
him. Bad people had pressure groups; the Man of Good Will had
only his civic organizations. Far from joining organizations to advance his own interests, he would disassociate himself from such
combinations and address himself directly and high-mindedly to
the problems of government. His approach to problems was, in a
sense, intellectualistic: he would study the issues and think them
through, rather than learn about them through pursuing his
needs18
The reformers' conception of the tasks confronting municipal
goverment thus left little room for the clash of sharply diverging
interests and irreconcilable values.19 Issues that might arise in the
course of performing those tasks were to be decided in accordance
with "the public interest," an interest that was determinable, if not in
some ultimate philosophical sense, at least in the sense that it corresponded to a broad societal consensus about the goals of the community. It should occasion no surprise that, holding this conception of the
municipal political order, the reformers tended to stress goals such as
honesty, efficiency, and municipal growth and prosperity.
From the perspective of our own time, the assumptions of the
Progressive reformers are likely to seem either naive or disingenuous.
Few contemporary observers would deny that the issues faced by cities
are political. The contemporary appreciation of the political character of the issues rests not only upon the understanding that they are
often controversial-technical issues, after all, may also produce spirited disagreement-but upon an awareness that issues often will have
17

R. Hofstadter, supra note 15, at 200.

18 Id. at 258-59. "[T]he Man of Cood Will," Hofstadter observed, was "the same innocent,

bewildered, bespectacled, and mustached figure we see in the cartoons today labeled John Q.
Public-a white collar or small business voter-taxpayer with perhaps a modest home in the
suburbs." Id. at 258.
19Like any political movement, the Progressives were not monolithic, and they did not have
a fully consistent program. There was, for e.xample, substantial support among the Progressives
for proportional representation, a proposal that rested on premises quite different from those
underlying most of the Progressives" reform proposals. See generally Id. at 25S-67.
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become controversial because they bring important interests and
values into conflict. The Progressive reformers' assumption that the
questions confronting local governments were more technical than
political, and that the disinterested analysis of experts and of the Man
of Good Will would therefore yield answers to them, depended on the
further assumption that there were right answers to those questions,
an assumption that was plausible only because the Progressives ignored many of the interests and values that might have been affected
by a municipal decision. Thus, issues that the reformers regarded as
technical may, on a broader view, have involved fundamental political questions about the legitimate ends of government and the appropriate ordering of those ends in the event of a conflict among them.
The question of where to locate a new school, for example, appears to
present merely a technical problem if the only end in view is to
minimize travel time for students or to reduce the number of major
thoroughfares that they will be required to cross. But these objectives
may, in some instances, collide with the goal of racial integration.
Disinterested analysis will not yield an answer to the problem of
determining which of these goals should be pursued and at what cost.
A choice is required, and the experience of daily life teaches that
different citizens, moved by their private interests or by differing
conceptions of the public interest or by both, will choose differently.
The reformers' concentration on the public interest and their
failure to take account of private or special interests also led them to
ignore one of the most important tasks of government at every level:
the management of conflict. Their assumption that the public interest
could be defined, or perhaps that it merely awaited discovery, led
them to suppose that all governmental decisions should be made "on
the merits," that is, in accordance with a limited (though not necessarily well-defined) set of criteria, such as "efficiency," and without
reference to the "special interests of particular individuals or groups."
Yet it is, as Banfield and Wilson maintain, "entirely possible that in
some circumstances it is more important to manage conflict than to
make the most 'efficient' use of resources. '20 Conciliation and compromise are, in a free society, essential to the continuing operation of
government and at times to its stability. The need runs deeper than
that which can be satisfied by a mere awareness of the importance of
searching out compromise solutions to issues viewed in isolation. In
the ideal world of the Progressive reformers, each issue would be
judged on its own merits; logrolling would be regarded as one of the

20 E.

Banfield & J. Wilson, supra note 15, at 19.
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vices of politics. But in the real world, in which all values cannot be
achieved simultaneously and individuals or groups differ both about
objectives and their importance, logrolling offers opportunities for
achieving results that, if not optimal from any one perspective, are at
least satisfactory to the contending interests. The trading of votes is, of
course, anathema to those who suppose that every issue of governmental policy should be decided in accordance with an ascertainable
public interest, an interest that exists apart from the special interests
of those whose lives will be affected by the policy. The practice may,
however, be viewed more sympathetically if private and public interests are not so sharply differentiated: if, that is, we are prepared to
recognize that conceptions of the public interest shape and are shaped
by private interests and that the satisfaction of human desires has
some relationship to any plausible meaning that can be assigned to
"the public interest."
Although I suggested earlier that there is a temptation to view
the assumptions underlying the Progressives' reform proposals as naive
or disingenuous, I do not mean to charge them with insincerity. It is
worth noting, however, that their proposals for reforming municipal
government rested upon a conception of the public interest that was
not entirely divorced from their private interests. The Progressives
arose out of and drew most of their support from a class that was, or
felt itself to be, under siege. In his Autobiography, William Allen
White described the Bull Moose Movement as "a movement of little
businessmen, professional men, well-to-do farmers, skilled artisans
from the upper brackets of organized labor..., the successful middle-class country-town citizens, the farmer whose barn was painted,
the well-paid railroad engineer, and the country editor." 2' The
status and the political influence that traditionally had been enjoyed
by such individuals were threatened by the changes in economic and
social order to which I adverted above. The threat came from two
directions: on the one hand, from the increasing importance of the
men who controlled major industrial enterprises and concentrations of
capital, and on the other from the swelling urban population, including particularly the large number of immigrants from Eastern and
Southern Europe. Disparate as these groups may have been, in one
respect they posed a common threat to the middle class. For different
reasons and in different ways, both supported the "machines" and the
"bosses" that had come to dominate politics in many cities.

21

Quoted in R. Hofstadter, supra note 15, at 132.
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All the reforms of municipal government proposed by the Progressives were shaped by their desire to rid cities of machine politics.
Machine politics was characterized by corruption, inefficiency, and
the concentration of political power. The reforms were aimed at
producing honesty, efficiency, and broad citizen participation in politics. It does not depreciate the seriousness of the evils they opposed or
the value of their goals to recognize that, in seeking to destroy the
machines, the Progressives were attempting to diminish the influence
of those who had supplanted them in governing the nation's cities.
They sought to restore what they perceived to be the politics of an
earlier time. It is not beside the point that it was a politics in which
their influence, or the influence of those like them, had flourished.
The Progressives' desire to establish a style of politics that would
restore their diminished influence was related to more tangible interests. They saw themselves as the inheritors of an American tradition
that, as Hofstadter wrote,
had been one of unusually widespread participation of the citizen
in the management of affairs, both political and economic. Now
the growth of the large corporation, the labor union, and the big
impenetrable political machine was clotting society into large aggregates and presenting to the unorganized citizen the prospect
that all these aggregates and interests would be able to act in
concert and shut out
those men for whom organization was difficult or impossible. 22
The divergence of interests of the Progressives and the newly emerging
groups is illustrated by the different demands made upon urban political systems by the newest wave of immigrants and by the middle class.
The former, who in many cities outnumbered the native-born population, were the products of a political culture very different from that
of the typical Progressive, and their needs differed from those of the
middle class just as significantly. The immigrants tended to view
government in personal terms, in relation to their needs and their
relationships with political leaders, rather than in terms of such abstract concepts as efficiency and the public interest. They sought from
government, or what to them was the same thing, from political
leaders, such tangibles as jobs, a street vendor's license, protection
from the law, and a measure of security from the economic uncertainties of their lives. In return, they offered their votes. The alliance
between the immigrants and the machines thus rested upon a foundation quite different from that which the Progressives believed essential

22

Id. at 213-14.
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to good government. It also threatened the more immediate interests
of the Progressives, at the very least by increasing the cost of municipal services and perhaps also by altering the package of services
provided by municipal government.
I do not mean to suggest that the Progressives' private interests
dictated their conception of the public interest. It may be that their
ideas regarding the obligations of citizenship and the nature of good
government influenced the demands that they made upon government. My point, rather, is that there was an intimate relationship
among the Progressives' private interests, their conception of the public interest, and the reforms of municipal government that they proposed. Their reform program was cast solely as a reform of the political process. The goals articulated in its support were, by and large,
presented as neutral or technical process goals. There is no reason to
doubt their sincerity in advancing those goals, but it should also be
recognized that the reform program promoted private interests and a
particular conception of the public interest. Of necessity, it did so at
the expense of other private interests and other conceptions of the
public interest.
II
The language of discourse changes markedly when we move
from proposals for the reform of city politics at the turn of the century
to contemporary discussion of constitutional law. We speak less of
"interests," either public or private, and more of "rights" and
"'values." Those who seek to restrict the domain of politics rest their
claims upon "law," not upon assertions regarding the characteristics
of "good government." Nevertheless, there are important similarities
between the reform proposals and the justifications that recently have
been advanced for judicial review.
In broad terms, both address the same problem, the means by
which governmental policy should be determined in a community
whose members have significantly differing interests and values. At
times, moreover, the language employed in justifying judicial review
is strongly reminiscent of that employed by the Progressive reformers.
Thus, Abram Chayes, in arguing for an expansion of the judicial role,
observes that judges are insulated from "narrow political pressures";
they are characterized by "disinterestedness" and are "governed by a
professional ideal of reflective and dispassionate analysis."23 Jesse
2 Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1281. 1307-09
(1976).
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Choper similarly maintains that the judicial process offers the prospect of more "dispassionate decisionmaking" and greater "objectivity"
than does the legislative process because of the judges' "aloofness from
the political system and ... lack of dependence for maintenance in
office on the popularity of a particular ruling" and "the more deliber2' 4
ative, contemplative quality of the judicial process.
The unarticulated and perhaps unrecognized premise of these
arguments is that the questions judges are called upon to decide in
giving meaning to the Constitution are technical ones, technical in the
sense that answers to them can be ascertained by employing the
correct techniques. In the absence of such a premise, it is difficult to
understand how the qualities with which judges are credited can be
thought to be sufficient to justify the role that they play in deciding
those questions. The notion that constitutional questions are technical, and that those who have the requisite training and expertise in the
law are especially qualified to answer them, is familiar and has played
an important part in our constitutional history. It is accepted, even
today, by some students of constitutional law.25 For at least a half
century, however, it has been common ground among most students
of constitutional law that the choice and ordering of values is an
element of constitutional decision. Differences persist about the range
of discretion and the nature of the limits by which choice is confined,
but its existence is commonly if not universally accepted.
Once the necessity of choice is recognized, however, it is apparent that the qualities Chayes and Choper attribute to judges are
insufficient to justify the power they would vest in courts. Questions
like those that I described earlier-e.g., questions concerning the
proper direction and pace of the law's response to changing ideas
regarding the role of women or the appropriate governmental policy
toward private (including church-affiliated) schools-will not yield to
disinterested analysis and reflectiveness. Those qualities are, of
course, indispensable in identifying and clarifying alternatives and
their consequences, but they cannot alone enable judges to select from
among the alternatives that have been identified. Nor will our national experience permit us to indulge an assumption, akin to that
made by the Progressive reformers about the issues confronted by
municipal government, that persons of good will, aided by technical
J.Choper, Judicial Review and the National Political Process 68 (1980).
E.g., R. Berger, Government By Judiciary (1977); R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously
(1977). As these references demonstrate, the claim that there are right answers to constitutional
questions is made by persons who hold widely diverging views about the source of those answers
and the techniques by which they may be ascertained.
2'

2
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experts, will all respond similarly to those issues for which answers are
sought in the Constitution. How, then, is a court to choose from
among the welter of interests that is likely to be at stake whenever an
attempt is made to substitute constitutional adjudication for political
decision? Whose values, given the diversity of our population, are to
guide a court in making a selection from among the competing interests?
The principal objection to the constitutionalization of our law is
not that courts lack the means to answer these questions. It is, rather,
that reliance upon constitutional adjudication to determine governmental policy weakens law's responsiveness to those who are governed
by it. The relative insulation of courts from politics is not, in other
words, a reason for preferring judicial to legislative decisions, but the
weightiest argument for the opposite conclusion. Political responsibility is, as I have urged elsewhere, the ultimate source of law's legitimacy in a democratic society, an essential means of realizing
the democratic ideal that governmental policies ought to respond to
the wishes of the citizenry .... First, it provides a means by which
government is made more sensitive to the impact of a policy upon
the various segments of the society and thereby contributes to the
calculation of gains and losses resulting from that policy. Second,
since an appraisal of the consequences of policy involves not merely
a measurement of gains and losses, but a judgment of what is to
count as a gain or loss and how these shall be balanced, political
responsibility helps ensure that governmental policy will not depart
too far from the values of the citizenry. Finally, the political responsibility of the legislature creates an incentive for compromise
and accommodation that facilitates development of policies that
maximize the satisfaction of constituents' desires.26
Reducing the influence of politics upon governmental policy is, in
short, a means of reducing the influence on policy of those whose lives
are affected by it.
Contemporary apologists for judicial review do not in general
dispute the force of these considerations. They maintain, instead, that
there are issues of governmental policy that the political process cannot be trusted to decide. Just because they are politically responsive, it
is often argued, democratic governments cannot be trusted to respect
the rights of unpopular minorities and individuals. Courts are the
proper agency to determine those rights, the argument continues,

26 Sandalow, Racial Preferences in Higher Education: Political Responsibility and the Judicial Role, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 653, 695 (1975).
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precisely because they are not politically responsive. As customarily
stated, however, this argument fails to distinguish between two quite
different problems for which government must provide responses: on
the one hand, the protection of individual and minority rights and, on
the other, the definition of the rights that individuals and minorities
should have. There is good reason to suppose that courts are indeed
best able to perform the former role, but contemporary proponents of
judicial review seem primarily concerned with defending courts in the
latter role. It is, however, far more difficult to understand what
mandate courts can claim for exercising power to determine what the
rights of individuals and minorities should be, especially since decisions regarding those rights will have an important impact upon the
interests of others.
In describing the Progressive proposals for reform of municipal
government, I suggested that the proposals-though cast only as reforms of process-had important substantive objectives. The attempt
to reduce the influence of politics in municipal government was in
significant part an attempt to advance certain private interests and
certain conceptions of the public interest and to do so, inevitably, at
the expense of other private interests and other conceptions of the
public interest. A similar objective seems generally to underlie the
attempt to substitute constitutional adjudication for legislative decision. The minorities and interests that are held to require judicial
"protection" are almost invariably those that, it is said, will not
receive through the political process what their sympathizers regard as
their due.2 7 During the first third of this century, thus, the inadequacies of the political process were felt most keenly by those who feared
that legislative majorities could not be trusted to give due recognition
to economic freedoms and the "rights" of property. These were perceived as the interests of minorities, and judicial intervention was
thought to be necessary, in part, because the affected minorities
would not be protected adequately by the political process. More
recently, the political process has been thought to be inadequate to
ensure appropriate recognition of very different interests and minorities. During both periods, it seems fair to conclude that, as with the
Progressive reform proposals, views about the desirable process for
determining policy are bound up with private interests and conceptions of the public interest.
The extent to which claims about the inadequacies of the political process are dependent upon judgments about the content of gov217See, e.g., Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 Phil. & Pub. Aft. 107 (1976);
Michelman, Welfare Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 Wash. U.L.Q. 659.
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ernmental policy is strikingly demonstrated by Professor John Hart
Ely's recent elaboration of the argument that courts have a special
responsibility to protect (some) minorities.2- Ely's argument is of
special interest because of his insistence that courts may not properly
employ the power of judicial review to impose limits upon the political process. Unless limits are set by the Constitution, he maintains,
courts lack authority to concern themselves with the "substantive
merits of the political choice." 29 Nevertheless, he argues, democratic
legislatures cannot be trusted to represent (some) minorities fairly and
courts should, therefore, police legislative decisions to compensate for
that deficiency of the political process. In the remainder of this Article, I hope to show that the distrust of politics that underlies Ely's
argument has little to do with the asserted deficiencies of the political
process. It rests, rather, on unarticulated views about the proper
direction of public policy. Like the Progressives, he seeks to structure
the process by which governmental policy is made on the assumption
that there are right answers to the question of what that policy ought
to be.
Ely's argument for the judicial protection of minorities begins
with the premise that the equal protection clause entitles all persons to
"'equal concern and respect," to have their interests equally taken into
account when government acts and to participate on equal terms in
the political process.30 Legislation that expresses no purpose other
than that of harming a minority (or that intentionally or inadvertently
ignores its interests) violates that requirement. Determining whether
the legislature had the illicit intent requires an examination of legislative motive, and though Ely sanctions such an inquiry, he recognizes
that it alone will provide little protection for minorities. He argues,
however, that the "suspect classification" doctrine serves as a "handmaiden" of motivation inquiry, extending the protection that courts
can offer minorities. 31 In a brilliant reconstruction of the doctrine
fashioned by the Supreme Court, he maintains that the familiar elements of "strict scrutiny"-the requirements of "close fit" and of "a
compelling state interest"-are techniques for determining whether a
classification is designed to serve the illicit purpose of harming a
minority. If the (legitimate) purpose that is advanced to justify the
legislation can be served as well by another classification, he contends,
a court should conclude that the legislation was illicitly motivated.
28 J. Ely, Democracy and Distrust (1980).
Id. at 181.
: Id. at 77.
31 Id. at 145.
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The requirement of "fit" thus serves as a way of "flushing out" unconstitutionally motivated statutes. The same purpose is served, on Ely's
analysis, by the second element of "special scrutiny." If the legislative
goal offered to support the statute is not sufficiently important, a
conclusion is justified that the legislation was
prompted by the imper32
missible motive of harming the minority.
The object of the entire inquiry, as Ely puts it, is "to identify
those groups in society to whose needs and wishes elected officials
have no apparent interest in attending," 33 those who cannot obtain
the protections that pluralist politics normally accords minorities. We
need now examine the ways in which he goes about identifying those
groups, for it is in the discussion of that question that he reveals the
extent to which his theory depends upon value choices regarding the
appropriate direction of public policy.
The paradigm of the "discrete and insular minority" is, of course,
blacks in the years preceding the decade between Brown v. Board of
Education34 and the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It is important to
understand why that is so. Throughout the South, where most blacks
lived, they were with rare exception denied the opportunity to vote or
otherwise to participate in political life. Moreover, and of at least
equal importance, in both the South and the North they were the
victims of social practices (and in the South a legal system) that
systematically denied them opportunities to associate with members
of the white majority. Employment, education, housing, recreationin short, all areas of life-were racially segregated, or near enough to
being so that we need not worry overly much about the exceptions.
Blacks were, to make the point directly, deprived of all those opportunities that democratic pluralism normally offers groups to protect
their interests. They were not permitted to participate in politics
directly nor to maintain relationships that would permit them to
establish common interests with others. Within the past two decades,
however, the position of blacks in the United States has dramatically
changed. Though a deplorable degree of segregation remains, blacks
are now effectively protected in the exercise of the franchise and are
substantially, if not proportionately, represented throughout American life. Relationships have been established that permit them to
draw upon the support of others, both institutions and individuals, in
defense of their interests. The question, then, is whether in 1981
blacks can claim the protection of Ely's "suspect classification" anal32

See id. at 145-70.

33 Id. at 151.

- 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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ysis; are they, in other words, one of "those groups in society to whose
needs and wishes elected officials have no apparent interest in attending,?
Ely acknowledges that changes have occurred over the past
twenty years, but concludes nonetheless that blacks continue to be
entitled to special judicial protection. His reasons for that conclusion
are not pellucidly stated, but they appear to rest on the belief that the
interests of blacks are not yet sufficiently well recognized by government. Thus, he writes that the pluralist model does work sometimes,
"[b]ut sometimes it doesn't, as the single example of how our society
has treated its black minority (even after that minority had gained
every official attribute of access to the process) is more than sufficient
to prove."' 35 The judgment that is being made is, plainly, a judgment

about the content of public policy, i.e., about whether blacks receive
from government all the benefits that they should receive, not about
the process by which policy is determined. To justify special judicial
solicitude for blacks by appraising the outcomes of the political
process is, however, to assume a standard for such an appraisal.
To be sure, Ely does not purport to base his analysis upon an
assessment of the outcome of the political process; indeed, he repeatedly claims to eschew such judgments on the ground that they are
appropriate for the legislature. Rather, he argues that the touchstone
for determining whether a group is entitled to special judicial solicitude is whether it is the object of widespread hostility and prejudice.
Legislation that marks out such groups for distinctive treatment, he
argues, is especially likely to ignore the right of their members to be
treated with "equal concern and respect." Ely does not directly address the question of how a court is to determine whether one or
another group meets the specifications that would entitle it to special
judicial protection, but the issue is, seemingly, to be the subject of
judicial notice. It is far from evident, however, how a court is to make
the necessary determinations and how likely it is that those determinations will be uninfluenced by judgments about whether a group has
fared well or badly in the legislative process. Professor Ely believes,
for example, that "the poor" meet his specifications for special judicial
protection. One wonders whether the same conclusion would be
reached by a judge who thinks that the array of benefits that the law
provides for the poor is exceedingly generous.
In any event, it is plain that an evaluation of legislative policy is
necessary to the further judgments that courts would be required to

3 J. Ely, supra note 28, at 135.

HeinOnline -- 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 463 1981

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

(Vol, 56:446

make in determining whether legislation employing a "suspect classification" reflects adequate concern for the interests of the minority it
disadvantages. The point is most obvious when a court is required to
determine whether the governmental interest is sufficient to overcome
the suspicion that the classification was prompted by a desire to harm
the minority. But it is equally true when the court is required to
determine whether the classification fits the objective advanced in
support of the legislation. Since the classification can be abandoned
only at a cost, the court must evaluate those costs in relation to the
harm imposed upon the minority by use of the classification. 3 Both
prongs of Ely's "strict scrutiny" analysis require, therefore, that courts
reassess the balance struck by the legislature. Although Ely may wish
to rationalize the inquiry as a search for illicit motive, the determinations that judges would be required to make are indistinguishable
from those that would be required if they were to undertake directly
to evaluate the merits of the legislative choice. The conclusion that
legislation manifests an illicit motive, to put the point somewhat
differently, will almost invariably turn upon a judgment regarding
the costs that the minority should be expected to bear in furtherance
of the legislature's conception of the public interest.
The dependence of Ely's argument upon judgments about the
outcomes of the political process can be demonstrated by considering
the claim to special protection of a group that Ely interestingly fails to
mention, the wealthy. The omission is especially striking because the
protection of property and of propertied classes was surely more central to the objectives of the Framers than was the protection of those
groups (other than blacks) whose claims to special protection Ely does
discuss-aliens, women, homosexuals, and the poor. In discussing the
claims of the latter, Ely rests heavily upon the argument that legislators are apt to give insufficient weight to the costs of discrimination
against groups that are victims of widespread prejudice and that are a
minority in the legislative body itself. Now the wealthy-or if you
prefer, the very wealthy-are surely a minority in our legislatures and
are the victims of widespread prejudice that denies them the empathetic understanding of legislators. How many legislators appreciate
the costs imposed upon the wealthy by progressive income and estate
taxation? Significantly, our statute books contain far more legislation
that discriminates on the basis of wealth and income than legislation
that employs racial classifications. Why, then, are blacks but not the
wealthy entitled to the benefit of special judicial protection?
30 See generally Note, Legislative Purpose, Rationality, and Equal Protection, 82 Yale L.J.

123 (1972).
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Since Professor Ely does not address the question, I do not know
what his answer would be. I have, however, often put the question to
students, who invariably respond that the wealthy do not require
judicial protection. The political system is not stacked against them, it
takes account of their interests, as demonstrated by the "fact" that
they, unlike blacks, derive a great deal of benefit from the system.
The conclusion that the political process adequately protects the
wealthy is, however, not a judgment on the internal fairness of the
process, but a reflection of attitudes toward the outcomes that it
yields. Like the contrary judgment about blacks, it presupposes some
standard by which a determination can be made whether one or
another group adequately benefits from the political system.
Counsel for the legislature might advance a quite different justification for discrimination against the wealthy. He might concede that
the wealthy are entitled to the protection of the "suspect classification" doctrine, but contend that discrimination against them is nonetheless justified because of the importance of the legislature's purpose
(say, reducing income inequality) and because the classification perfectly fits that purpose. Since this is precisely the argument that Ely
makes in regard to legislation that discriminates against burglars, it
will be more illuminating to consider that illustration of his theory.
Laws discriminating against burglars, either by prohibiting burglary
or by prohibiting burglars from obtaining medical licenses, are valid
on Ely's analysis, even though burglars are the object of widespread
hostility, 37 because

[t]here is so patently a substantial goal here, that of protecting our
homes by penalizing those who break and enter them, and the fit
between that goal and the classification is so close, that whatever
suspicion such a classification might under other circumstances
engender is allayed so immediately it doesn't even have time to
38
register.

For reasons that are unstated, however, Ely reaches a different
conclusion about laws that discriminate against homosexuals. He is at
pains to establish that homosexuals are a "suspect class" 39 and, although acknowledging that the state may legislate against homosexual
activity, he intimates that laws denying homosexuals employment
opportunities should ordinarily be held invalid.40 Precisely why such

And, presumably, not a majority of the legislature.
3sJ. Ely, supra note 28, at 154.
39Id. at 162-64.
40 Id. at 255-56 n.92.
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laws should not be sustained on the same basis as those denying
employment opportunities to burglars, i.e., a desire to deter activity
that the legislature considers immoral, is never made clear.4" We are
left to speculate that Ely believes homosexual activity is not the moral
equivalent of burglary and that the law should not, therefore, treat
homosexuals in the same way that it treats burglars.
The evaluation of public policy thus plays a central role in Ely's
analysis. His conclusions about which of the innumerable minorities
that constitute our polity are entitled to special judicial protection and
the level of protection they should receive depend upon judgments
about how those groups should fare at the hands of government. Nor
is it surprising that that should be so. Democratic theory does not
provide an equivalent of the economist's model of perfect competition; except in the most egregious cases, we have no means of ascertaining by an examination of the inner workings of the political
system whether all or any of the interests in society are adequately
represented. In the absence of a model of perfect democracy, it is
difficult to understand how, without appraising results, judgments
could be made about whether one or another group has the "right
amount" of political influence, or at least sufficient influence to obviate the need for special judicial solicitude for its interests.
To be sure, our history does provide an example of a minority,
blacks, that for nearly a century was for all practical purposes excluded from politics. The exclusion was effected not merely by a
denial of formal participation, but by a social and legal order that
may well have been designed, and in any event served, to prevent
blacks from making common cause with other citizens. Whether or
not judicial intervention is warranted in so egregious a situation, I do
not see how it can be maintained that blacks or any other group
confront a similar situation today. Even aliens, who are excluded
from formal participation in the political process, have varied opportunities to influence the political process and to enlist the support of
others who identify with them or whose interests are intertwined with
theirs. The identification of one or another impediment to a group's
influence, in other words, tells us very little about the ability of that
group to influence the political system. Corporations also do not vote,
but those who argue that aliens should be accorded the special protec41 It is possible that Ely means to distinguish between engaging in homosexual activity and
"being a homosexual." But "being a homosexual" is not, in any legal setting of which I am
aware, a condition like being a woman or a black. I know of no situation in which individuals
have been subjected to disabilities for "being a homosexual," without proof of homosexual

activity.
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tion of a "suspect class" do not frequently complain that corporations
should also receive that protection because they lack political influence. Any attempt to appraise the inner workings of the political

process must, as the illustration of the corporation suggests, examine
the entire process to ascertain the extent of a group's influence. But
once that inquiry is undertaken, what measure have we, other than
an evaluation of outcomes, for comparing the influence of various
groups and judging whether some have too little? The judgment that
would be required of courts in performing the function Ely assigns to
them would thus impose a burden that might cause even Hercules to
buckle, for nothing less would suffice than a determination of whether
each group claiming special judicial protection is, across the entire
range of issues subject to governmental policy, being justly treated by
government. How else is a court to know whether "the group is one to
whose interests the legislature has any interest in attending"?
No doubt, Professor Ely does not intend to impose any such
burden upon the courts, but merely to require that courts make a
judgment about whether minorities have been fairly treated in each
instance in which they have been singled out for distinctive treatment.
But even if we ignore the problem of deciding which minorities are to
be the beneficiaries of such judicial scrutiny, there is the further
question of determining whether, in the particular instance, the minority has been treated fairly or, in Ely's terms, with "equal concern
and respect." A judgment about that question inevitably involves,
indeed cannot easily be distinguished from, a judgment about the
proper choice and ordering of values. Thus, even if we accept Ely's
argument that alienage should be held to be a suspect classification,
the judgment whether any particular discrimination against aliens
reflects inadequate regard for their right to "equal concern and respect" cannot be separated from the judgment whether the reasons
advanced to justify the discrimination are sufficiently weighty. But
the necessity for the latter judgment merely raises once again the
question how judges are to justify their decisions. Although Ely elsewhere purports to deny judges authority to employ the equal protection clause or another of the Constitution's open-ended provisions as a
vehicle for reviewing the substantive merits of a political choice, 42 the
role he assigns judges in protecting minorities forces him to confer
precisely that power. At virtually every step in the argument, his
claims about the inadequacy of process resolve into an appraisal of
substantive policies. Ely does not assert, indeed he denies, that judges
42

J.Ely, supra note 28, at 43-72, 181.
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have access to a controlling norm by which they may justify such
appraisals, yet his arguments for judicial protection of minorities
tacitly assume that such norms exist and that there are right answers
to the question how minorities should be treated.
CONCLUSION

The distrust of politics, in sum, often reflects merely a disagreement with the results it yields, and the attempt to reduce its influence
on governmental policy nothing more than an effort to substitute a
process of decision that will advance interests and values that might
not prevail in the political process. It is, however, no small matter to
narrow the domain of politics. In a democratic society, politics is the
means by which governmental policy is made responsive to the interests and desires of those whose lives it governs. Of course, whether
decisions are made politically or by some other means, setting policy
necessitates that the interests and values of some individuals be sacrificed to those of others. Choice is inescapable. But when politically
made, the decision rests upon the foundation of democratic theory.
We have as yet no theory that explains how judges may justify preferring the interests and values of some individuals to those of others.
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